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The publication of Martin Heidegger’s early writings as part of the 
Gesamtausgabe in the 1980s and 1990s1 deeply modified the reception of his 
whole work. The first (mostly North American) commentators of these 
early writings favored a “genealogical” reading. Theodore Kisiel’s book, The 
Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1993),2 is a paradigmatic illustration 
of this line of interpretation, which treated that part of the corpus as a set of 
preparatory drafts for the 1927 opus magnum. 
This genealogical approach was almost always associated with a contex-
tualized reading of Heidegger’s early writings, in particular of his Freiburg 
lecture courses from 1919–1923. Theodore Kisiel, John Van Buren, and Jef-
frey Barash, among others, were very sensitive to the historical background 
of Heidegger’s early writing against which he progressively shaped his ma-
ture philosophy. They highlight what these early writings owe to Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Brentano’s psychology, Neo-Kantian schools of thought, 
and Diltheyan Life-philosophy, but also, to another extent, to Sören Kierke-
gaard, Augustine, Paul, Aristotle, and Plato. Consequently, late 20th-century 
exegesis of the early Heidegger remained for a long time comparative, inso-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1. See “Heideggers Werke” below.  
2. See also T. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Berkeley/Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Some other works representative of 
this philosophical moment are: J. Van Buren, The Young Heidegger. Rumor of the 
Hidden King, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994; T. Kisiel, 
J. Van Buren (eds.), Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought, 
New York: SUNY Press, 1994; J.-F. Courtine (ed.), Heidegger 1919-1929. De 
l’herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein, Paris: Vrin, 1996; T. Kisiel, 
T. Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 
1910-1927, Evanston: Northwest University Press, 2007. The history of this postpo-
ned reception of Heidegger’s early philosophy has been recounted by S.-J. Arrien 
and S. Camilleri in the editor’s foreword of their book Le jeune Heidegger (1909-
1926). Herméneutique, phénoménologie, théologie, Paris: Vrin, 2010, 7-23. 
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far as it limited itself to piecing together Heidegger’s reading and interpreta-
tion of the aforementioned thinkers. From a doxographic point of view, 
these genealogical and comparative approaches have undoubtedly been very 
fruitful. Among other things, they made clear that Heidegger’s early philo-
sophy, far from being unmoored and isolated, was in fact deeply grounded in 
main issues, representatives, and concepts of late 19th-century German phi-
losophy. Heidegger struggled from the start to find his own way – a way that 
would ultimately lead him to write Being and Time. 
There are, however, some limitations to those approaches. Over the last 
two decades, a new generation of commentators of the early writings (among 
them Christian Sommer, Sophie-Jan Arrien, Francisco de Lara, etc.) has cast 
some doubt on the relevance of a reading that is mainly, and sometimes 
merely, retrospective. The most valuable contribution of this new line of 
approach was perhaps to draw attention to the fact that “comparative” read-
ings tend to overlook the relative originality of Heidegger’s early thinking, 
both in comparison to the work of his predecessors, and to the later develop-
ments of his own thought. In other words, the first wave of commentators 
more or less explicitly denied that the early Heidegger had developed an 
autonomous philosophy. Conversely, the new commentators favored an 
“immanent” reading of the early writings. This allowed them to emphasize 
the specificity of the methodology, concepts, and philosophical objects to be 
found in what is now commonly known as Heidegger’s “phenomenology of 
life,” or “hermeneutics of facticity.” 
Expanding on this recent reading, the present book aims to shed new 
light on Heidegger’s early philosophy by analysing some of its fundamental 
concepts. Heidegger’s early writings present themselves as a radical reformu-
lation of the task of philosophy in general, and that implies a whole new set 
of concepts. This volume will focus on the peculiar and ad hoc vocabulary of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. However, its purpose is less to draw 
up a kind of Lexikon than to examine the “conceptual signature” of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity within the history of philosophy.  
A first set of concepts are clearly inherited from the (historical or con-
temporary) philosophical tradition, although they are invested with new 
meaning within Heidegger’s phenomenology of life: Intentionalität, Kate-
gorie, Kairos (kairologisch), Leben/Erlebnis, Phänomen, Phänomenologie, 
Psychologie, Ontologie, Wissenschaft, Theorie, Ursprung/Ursprünglichkeit, 
Verstehen, Verantwortung, Weltanschauung, Wert/Geltung, etc. Other con-
cepts are typical of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, 
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his later philosophy: Formale Anzeige, Begriff (Ausdrucksbegriff, Ordnungs-
begriff), Diahermeneutik, Grunderfahrung, (sich-selbst) Haben, Das Heute, 
Rhythmus, Ruinanz, (hermeneutische) Situation, Selbstgenügsamkeit des Le-
bens, Vollzug, Selbst-, Mit-, Um-welt, etc. Lastly, there are some concepts 
that Heidegger introduced during the early period, and which he retained, 
sometimes with a different meaning, in the later work: Alltäglichkeit, das 
“Als”, Angst, Bekümmerung/Sorge, Augenblick, Auslegung/Interpretation, 
Bedeutsamkeit/Bedeutung, Bewegtheit/Bewegung, Destruktion/Abbau, Ex-
istenz, Faktizität, Geschichtlichkeit, Das Man, Vorgriff/Vorhabe, Wie 
(Grundwie), Wiederholung, Zeitigung, etc. 
The systematic explorations of these concepts will lead us to a better 
understanding of Heidegger’s early philosophy and to new insights on its 
originality.  
 
The twelve articles collected in this volume are divided into six sections, each 
with a different conceptual focus. The first two articles (Arrien, De Lara) 
address the concept of “science” (Wissenschaft) and seek to clarify what 
Heidegger had in mind when he coined the expression “originary pre-
theoretical science.” The second section (Guidi, Gauvry) deals with metho-
dological issues, focusing on the method itself of the newly designed philo-
sophy (formal indication, formale Anzeige), as well as on the status of its 
novel concepts. The third section (Farin, Serban, Fagniez) is concerned with 
central concepts in Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, namely that of life 
(Leben, Erleben) and lived-experience (Erlebnis). The fourth section (Sasaki, 
Eychenié) analyses Heidegger’s reformulation of the concept of “inner life” 
through an analysis of the concepts of “mood” (Stimmung) and “inner expe-
rience” (innere Erfahrung). The fifth section (Floyd, Camilleri) delves deeper 
into the complex connection between the hermeneutics of facticity and the 
philosophy of religion by reviewing the elemental concepts of “inner experi-
ence,” “proclamation” (Verkündigung), and “Christian facticity” (christlische 
Faktizität). The last section (Camilleri, Slama) investigates the social dimen-
sion of facticity by interrogating the place of “intersubjectivity” and “social 
intentionality” in the early Heidegger. 
Sophie-Jan Arrien’s opening chapter identifies the theoretical relevance 
as well as the limits of the philosophical undertaking of the early Heidegger. 
His critical yet productive effort to elaborate a new type of conceptuality 
(e.g. “formal indicative” conceptuality) is explicitly rooted in the mobility of 
life it strives to describe. Arrien shows how the idea of an “originary pre-
Introduction 
!10 
theoretical science,” from its first appearance in the 1919 “war-emergency 
semester,” sets the scope, methodological goal, and conceptual requirements 
of the “hermeneutics of facticity” to come. 
Francisco de Lara examines some key elements of Heidegger’s early 
philosophical project as they are outlined in the lecture courses taught be-
tween 1919 and 1921. His aim is to scrutinize Heidegger’s conception of 
philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. In particular, he prob-
lematizes and analyzes the tension between “originary science” and “science 
of origin” in order to gain a better grasp of Heidegger’s understanding of the 
task of philosophy in its relationship to concrete existence.  
Lucilla Guidi analyzes the performative dimension of Heidegger’s phe-
nomenological language through the method of formal indication. She ar-
gues that Heidegger’s specific use of language entails a performative dimen-
sion. It does not communicate any semantic content, but rather makes a 
transformative enactment that is required from the reader as well. In that 
respect, the method of formal indication can be seen to stand in continuity 
with Greek and Christian concepts of conversion. By analyzing the differ-
ence between formal indication and objective concepts, Guidi shows that 
formal indication may be understood as a critique and a radicalization of 
Husserl’s occasional expressions. Finally, by examining Heidegger’s concept 
of guilt in Being and Time, she shows how Heidegger continued to use for-
mal indication in that later work, albeit without thematizing it. 
Charlotte Gauvry focuses on the early Heidegger’s concept of anticipa-
tion (Vorgriff) in order to outline the main features of his philosophical 
method and, more precisely, the specificity of his theory of “concepts.” 
First, she clarifies the meaning of the “anticipation” concept by contrasting 
it with some kindred Heideggerian concepts, like idea (Idee) and prefigura-
tion (Vorzeichung). Second, she characterizes the role played by anticipation 
in Heidegger’s “formal indication” method as a connection between Ge-
haltssinn and Bezugssinn. She illustrates this interpretation by analyzing one 
of Heidegger’s own examples: the concept of “history.” This allows Gauvry 
to draw conclusions on both the formal and experiential aspects of concepts 
in the early Heidegger. 
In his chapter, Ingo Farin shows that Heidegger uses the concept of life 
in four different theoretical contexts: (1) the theoretical claim that life is the 
ground for all theory and scientific thematization; (2) the phenomenology of 
life, which delineates the structures of lived life in the world; (3) the meta-
physical postulation of a “pre-worldly” life as pure potentiality; and (4) the 
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theoretical claim that all life-relations are executed by the self, making it the 
center of lived life. The first two contexts are constructive, whereas the last 
two are critical and deconstruct the customary self-sufficiency of the objec-
tivities in the world. Farin argues that Heidegger conspicuously avoids any 
attempt to unify these very different conceptions into one coherent life-
philosophy. Instead, he uses the life-philosophical idiom of his time to artic-
ulate such themes as the everyday immersion in a meaningful and pre-
theoretical world, the essential world-distance of the self, and the ontological 
difference between the pure potentiality of Being and the actuality of entities 
in the world.                                 
Claudia Serban analyzes the strategy Heidegger develops in order to 
give a pre-theoretical and non-objectifying description of the structure of 
lived-experience (Erlebnis) in his 1919 and 1920 Freiburg lecture courses. In 
this way, Heidegger gave a fresh start to philosophy in general, and to phe-
nomenology in particular. Serban explores the meaning and consequences of 
this choice. She shows how several key concepts that the young Heidegger 
will abundantly use at least until Being and Time – such as worldliness (Welt-
lichkeit), significance (Bedeutsamkeit), accomplishment (Vollzug), and histo-
ricity (Geschichte) – progressively emerge in this early description of Erleb-
nis. She also argues that this conceptual framework allows Heidegger's re-
markable characterization of lived-experience as an enowning (Ereignis) to 
appear as grounded and consistent: the enowning of the Erlebnis is to be 
understood both as accomplishment and as intrinsically historical. 
Guillaume Fagniez examines how Heidegger develops his early concept 
of world from the perspective of life. Heidegger unfolds the life-world as a 
hermeneutical concept of the world, that is to say, as a concept based on the 
practical articulation of meaning and life and characterized by its processuali-
ty. But this anchoring of the world in life raises difficulties that are reflected 
by the internal tension of the conceptual triad: Selbstwelt, Umwelt, and Mit-
welt. The chapter sheds light on the disappearance of this triad from 
Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary by pointing out the paradigmatic func-
tion of Umwelt in the initial determination of the world as such. Finally, it 
draws attention to the fact that the world progressively takes on the meaning 
of dispossession of life and non-coincidence with oneself. Because the world 
is, moreover, conceived as an ontological model inadequate to life, the over-
coming of the world as a hermeneutical concept appears to be a presupposi-
tion of self-interpretation of life as such. 
Masatoshi Sasaki takes up an original stance by arguing that the early 
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Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiry into facticity soon led him to discov-
er that “being in the world” means nothing other than “being brought in a 
disposition in the world,” and that the very phenomenon of “disposition” 
(Stimmung) has the power to unveil the basic characteristics of the being of 
life (Leben) or Dasein. Sasaki further argues that if Stimmung has such a 
power, then it is bound to play a prominent methodological role part in the 
hermeneutics of facticity.  
Mathieu Echeynié, for his part, reminds us that Heidegger, from the 
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/1920) onwards, seems to drop the 
idea of an interiority of the self: he explains that the examination of the pure 
life, in which he intends to be engaged, is not an internal examination. How-
ever, Echeynié argues that it should not lead us to conclude that the early 
Heidegger totally breaks away from the idea of interiority. One concept, 
forged during the first Freiburg lecture courses, testifies in particular to the 
persistence of this idea in the early Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, 
namely the concept of Selbstwelt, world of the self. The point of the chapter 
is to determine the meaning and sources of this conception of the self’s inte-
riority. The chapter focuses on three texts of Heidegger’s phenomenology of 
religion: the lecture courses on Paul (1920/21), those on Augustine (1921), 
and a brief talk entitled The Problem of Sin in Luther (1924). Echeynié at-
tempts to demonstrate that the early Heidegger finds in Luther, and more 
precisely in his interpretation of Paul’s inner man, a genuine conception of 
interiority, one that is compatible with the life’s being in the world. 
Gregory Floyd focuses on Heidegger’s 1920/21 course Introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Religion, which he reads in the light of the clarifica-
tions and contextual claims provided in the later courses. First, Floyd exam-
ines how Heidegger articulates the prejudice for the theoretical in contem-
porary religious scholarship and shows why it is philosophically and phe-
nomenologically problematic. He then seeks to clarify the meaning of formal 
indication, especially in the context of the phenomenology of religion. He 
shows that formal indication is intended as a procedure for circumventing 
our “falling” into theoretical significance. Finally, relying on the Ontology 
lecture course of 1923, Floyd explores how language ultimately manifests 
both phenomena and our prejudices. What we see in the religion courses is a 
preference for the given language of Paul and Augustine over the objective 
language of a science of religion or philosophy. This is a central dimension of 
the hermeneutics of facticity, one that holds beyond the religious realm to all 
phenomena. To favor common sense or everyday language in the initial phe-
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nomenological description of experience is part of the process of formal 
indication. 
Sylvain Camilleri explores the meaning and scope of intersubjectivity in 
Heidegger’s early work, especially his phenomenology of religion. While 
acknowledging that Heidegger, like many of his peers and mentors (Dilthey, 
Husserl, or the Neo-Kantians), for the most part follows the “subjective 
way” as the way to go back to the origins of life and lived-experience, Camil-
leri argues that Heidegger – unlike his predecessors – did thematize more or 
less elliptically an “intersubjective way” in parallel with and in addition to the 
subjective one. Consequently, he turns to Heidegger’s lecture courses on 
Paul from 1920/21 in order to analyze his understanding of with-world 
(Mitwelt), community (Gemeinde), and empathy (Einfühlung) in the context 
of early Christian facticity. Camilleri’s goal is to show precisely under what 
conditions it might be possible to really acquire knowledge of one’s (inner) 
self through the other.   
Paul Slama’s closing chapter contrasts the hermeneutics of the early 
Heidegger with the “comprehensive sociology” of Max Weber about social 
intentionality. The heart of the controversy is explicitly present in one of 
Heidegger’s lecture courses, and resides in the way he describes collective 
intentionality. In Weber, collective intentionality is mostly irrational, but it 
must nevertheless be considered by sociology “as if” it were rational and 
teleological, even if the price to pay for that “as if” is a theoretical transfor-
mation of the social object. In the early Heidegger, while ordinary intention-
ality is indeed social, the description must preserve the singularity of the 
lived-experiences by means of variation and formal indication. In describing 
this controversy, Slama wants to show how phenomenology might be able to 
account for social reality. To this end, he underscores everything that sepa-
rates phenomenology from a certain conceptual sociology 3 .!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3. We are grateful to Professor Hans Reiner Sepp for having accepted our volu-
me in his “Ad Fontes” collection. Our thanks go to the contributors for their inspi-
ring work. We also would like to express our gratitude to the numerous reviewers of 
the volume for their helpful comments: Emiliano Battista, Ingo Farin, Gregory 
Floyd, Anne Le Goff and Kriszta Saljber, and to Ms. Adelheid Krautter and the Deu-
tsches Literaturarchiv of Marbach for authorizing the use of the cover picture, which 
was taken by Karl Löwith in 1923. Finally we would like to thank the Centre d’études 
phénoménologiques (Université catholique de Louvain), the PHI – Centre de recher-
ches en philosophie (Université libre de Bruxelles), and the Unité de recherches Tra-
verses (Université de Liège)for supporting financially this publication. [The editors]  
